In typical file systems, valuable data is vulnerable to being accidentally or maliciously deleted or overwritten. Versioning file systems protect data from accidents by transparently retaining old versions, but do less well in protecting data from malicious attack. These systems remain vulnerable to attackers who gain unauthorized access to prune old file versions, who bypass the file system to directly manipulate storage, or who exploit bugs in any part of the operating system. This paper presents VDisk, a secure, block-level versioning system that adds file-grain versioning to a standard, unmodified file system. VDisk consists of a set of untrusted user-mode tools and a trusted, secure kernel that is implemented within an isolated Xen virtual machine domain. The secure kernel is designed to be simple and thus trustworthy. This kernel logs file-system updates to a secure log, exports a read-only view of the log to the rest of the system and securely removes unwanted versions from the log. Secure cleaning is implemented in a two-level manner. An untrusted, user-mode cleaner selects log entries for reclamation and submits cleaning requests to the trusted VDisk kernel along with a proof that the request satisifies the device's version-retention policy. The secure kernel verifies the proof and updates the log.
INTRODUCTION
Users increasingly store important, irreplaceable data such as family photos, movies, etc. in file systems on their personal computers. It is essential that these file systems provide a persistence guarantee that is at least as strong as the value users place on their data. As the value of data increases so does expectation of data durability.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. To strengthen durability it is necessary to understand the threats that can undermine it. One class of threat is the physical loss or malfunction of the storage device. Bits on a disk or the disk itself may fail; machines and buildings may be destroyed.
A second class of threat is the removal or modification of data after its initial storage. In a classical file system it it just as easy to delete or overwrite data as it is to store it initially. As a result, a user's trust that data is stored depends on every subsequent action taken by the user and any others with access to the data, and also on software bugs that can lead to accidental corruption or deletion or can open opportunities for malicious attack.
Generally speaking, there are three approaches for dealing with one or the other of these threats. The first is an online approach that adds redundancy to every disk write (e.g., using RAID hardware or software). A variety of redundancy techniques exist that provide varying degrees of probablistic assurance of data durability. This approach protects data from the first class of threat but not the second. The system stores only a single version of data and thus an erroneous or malicious update may result in data loss.
The second approach is to create periodic snapshots of data. A key drawback of this approach compared to the online approach is that data created since the last snapshot is afforded no protection from failure. On the other hand, a key advantage is that data stored in a snapshot is immutable and thus protected from erroneous file-system actions. This protection, however, exists only as long as the snapshot does.
The third approach is to build a file system that stores multiple versions of files, including deleted ones. In many ways this approach combines the best features of the other two. First, new file versions are created on every write (or when a modified file is closed), similar to online replication, thus avoiding the window of vulnerability that recent updates face with snapshots. Second, file versions are immutable, like snapshots, thus avoiding vulnerability to erroneous updates faced with online replication strategies.
Placing versioning within a file system, however, is problematic in two ways. First, it is difficult for OS vendors to make changes to existing file systems. These systems are mission critical; their correctness and performance cannot be compromised by software changes. They are also complex, integrated with much of the operating system, and highly tuned. It is this complexity that creates the second problem for versioning file systems. While the goal of versioning is to enhance data durability, implementing this protection within the operating system leaves it as vulnerable as the rest of the system to bugs that can lead to incorrect behavior or malicious exploit.
VDisk
This paper presents the design, prototype implementation and evaluation of a system we have developed, called the Versioned Disk (VDisk) , that provides file versioning at the block level. VDisk is packaged as a thin layer above a device driver, along with the device driver itself, in an isolated Xen virtual-machine domain. This isolation completely protects the VDisk implementation from OS complexity, vulnerabilities and bugs. VDisk itself is designed to be as simple as possible so that its correctness can be easily verified and thus trusted. Its isolation means that its correctness does not depend on that of the operating system.
The key idea of VDisk is to split versioning into two implementation layers -a small, simple, trusted kernel and a set of untrusted user-mode tools -and to leave the operating system untouched.
VDisk's secure kernel performs three functions: logging, version exporting, and secure log cleaning. It is configured to control two disk partitions, one that stores a file system and another that stores a version log. It exports the file-system partition read-write and the log read-only using Xen's standard virtual device driver interface. It operates by logging every block written to the file system partition without interpreting the file-system semantics of those blocks.
Version access is implemented entirely in user space, where complexity and system-specifity are not a threat to data durability. In fact, our prototype uses a relational database to perform queries on the read-only log exported by VDisk, demonstrating the benefit of extracting version-access from trusted parts of the system. It would be unthinkable, for example, to graft MySQL into the operating system to provide versioning there as part of a versioning file system. We anticipate that other indexing tools, such as a Google-like index, would be equally or even more useful than MySQL. By placing version interpretation in user-mode, VDisk's version browsing is limited only by the imagination.
Finally, VDisk compresses the version log by removing unwanted versions using a two-tiered approach. Most of the log-cleaning work is performed by an untrusted, user-mode application that submits proof-bearing cleaning requests to the secure kernel. This approach isolates the secure system from most of the complexity associated with log cleaning, such as determining which parts of the log can be most fruitfully cleaned (using techniques similar to LFS's heat metric, for example [29] ). A cleaning request submitted to the secure kernel names a set of log entries to be reclaimed and provides a proof that these blocks are not needed to satisfy the VDisk's version-retention policy. The policy specifies, for example, how long versions should be retained and when versions are superseeded by newer versions and when not. For each block to be reclaimed, the proof may name other blocks that are read by the secure kernel to verify that the reclaimed blocks are indeed unneeded.
In summary, VDisk utilizes a novel division of labor for secure, versioned storage. At the lowest level is an isolated block-level versioning system that replicates every data write to a log, exports the log read-only, and provides a secure interface for reclaiming unwanted versions. At the intermediate level are standard file systems optimized for manipulation of the current version of file data, as they are today. But now, these systems need not be trusted to protect data durability, as indeed they cannot reasonably be; that is the job of the lowest level. Finally, at the top level are untrusted, user-mode tools that index the version log for access and that determine which old versions to remove from the log, how to remove them and when, subject to the version retention policy enforced by the lowest level.
RELATED WORK
A number of approaches have been explored for storing multiple versions of valuable file data. User-mode applications such as CVS [14] , RCS [35] , and PRCS [19] facilitate the maintenance and organization of file versions by allowing users to commit important versions of selected files to a repository. A variety of systems [15, 22, 4, 16, 27, 25, 18, 36, 26, 10] provide transparent snapshotting, enabling the periodic creation of file-system images.
Peabody [21] and TRAP [39] are block-level versioning systems. Peabody is an iSCSI, network-attached, block-level store that maintains a log of all write transactions it receives and that implements volume-grain undo by replaying this log in reverse starting from a volume snapshot, relying on the file-system level to ensure consistency (e.g., using a tool such as Unix's fsck). Peabody controls log growth by employing techniques such as content hashing and discarding silent writes. TRAP adds a version log to a RAID data store and uses this log to provide volume-grain undo. TRAP controls log growth by logging only a compressed, bit-wise XOR of each new block write it receives with the current value of that block on disk. Neither of this systems provide file-grain version access or log pruning, but both provide novel and effective lossless log compression.
Work on versioning file systems dates at least back to Cedar [13] and VMS [20] , which stored a bounded number of the most recent versions of each file, but not deleted files. More recently, Elephant [30] , a versioning file system integrated with FreeBSD, stored an unbounded number of file and directory versions and retained deleted files. It introduced the idea of retention policies that guide the automatic reclamation of some old file versions. VersionFS [23] and Wayback [5] are similar in some ways, but mainly differ by stacking versioning support on top of an existing Linux file system. S4 [34] and the Comprehensive Versioning File System (CVFS) use versioning for post-intrusion analysis and auditing [33] . CVFS retains every file-system update for a period of time so that system administrators can use this history to investigate malicious data propagation following an intrusion. Intrusion analysis is limited by log storage capacity which, combined with the rate at which data changes and compensated for by lossless log compression, determines an intrusion detection window. Our work shares many goals with CVFS. Key differences include how we provide isolation -in an isolated domain on the client machine rather than on a remote server -where we implement versioning -at the block level rather than in a file system -and how we control log growth. VDisk controls log growth using a secure, policy-driven approach to remove unwanted file versions from the log. This mechanism is not under the control of users and thus is not vunlerable to manipuation by an intruder. VDisk uses this lossy approach to retain some file versions much longer than CVFS; but on the other hand, it does not use CVFS's lossless compression, because doing so requires knowledge of file-system semantics that VDisk, as a block-level service, does not have.
ReVirt [6] and Backtrack [17] are two logging systems designed for intrusion analysis. ReVirt logs all non-deterministic system events so that the log can be replayed offline to reconstruct system state at an arbitrary historic point. Backtracker logs high-level system events and objects and uses the log to graph the objects an intruder may have affected during and following an attack. Chronos [37] is a logging service implemented using the µDenali virtual machine monitor [38] that logs changes made within a particular virtual machine for error diagnoses and recovery.
DESIGN
The goal of VDisk is to securely replicate and version disk data so that users can reasonably trust that their data is protected from physical failures, software bugs, malicious attacks and their own mistakes. Our strategy is to identify the minimal functionality needed to provide these guarantees and to isolate it from the rest of the system -including the file system and most of the versioning logicin a virtual-machine domain (provided in our prototype by Xen [3] ). The result is a three-tierd storage implementation that consists of a set of untrusted user-mode VDisk components, a standard in-kernel non-versioned file system, and the trusted VDisk secure kernel.
A key advantage of this approach is that isolating the VDisk kernel from the operating system greatly simplifies dealing with intrusion threats. To see why, it is useful to consider the broad class of threats the system faces. One type of threat involves an intruder gaining unauthorized access to the system and then using the OS API in an intended, but unauthorized, way. Countering this threat requires placing restrictions on every user, even the superuser, that prevent them from interfering with logging (or versioning), updating the log storage device directly, or causing the system to prematurely clean useful versions from the log. Another type of threat involves an intruder who exploits a bug in the system to cause it to perform in an unintended way. Countering this threat requires gaining confidence that the system is free of bugs. For both of these threats, complexity is the enemy. VDisk's approach is to place counter measures in a subsystem with a simple API, simple implementation, and complete isolation.
Operationally, VDisk's approach to versioning involves three tasks. First, the VDisk secure kernel logs every disk write. Second, the kernel exports the log read-only to a set of user-mode tools that browse or extract file versions from the log. Third, a log cleaner compresses the log periodically by removing unneeded versions. We have implemented a prototype of this system for Linux ext2 and ext3 file systems. The remainder of this section describes the system architecture and then covers the first two of these tasks. Section 4 covers log compression.
System Architecture
To the operating system a VDisk looks exactly like a standard Xen virtual disk driver. Behind this abstraction are two disk partitions (on the same or different disks), a version retention policy, and a client-system identifier. The two partitions are the target partition, which stores a standard file system, and the log partition, which stores the VDisk version logs. versions the system must retain (as described in Section 4.1). The client-system identifier names the file system installed in the target partition and is used to guide the logging optimizations described in Section 3.2. The policy, its parameters, and client-system ID are immutable once a VDisk instance is created; this immutability is necessary to ensure that the system is invulnerable to potential exploits that involve changing these values. If a secure mechanism existed for users to authenticate to the secure kernel, then it would be a simple matter to allow changes. This mechanism, however, is beyond the scope of the initial design described in this paper. Each VDisk is implemented by a separate, isolated instance of the VDisk secure kernel. The VDisk kernel is a minimal Xen virutal machine domain that consists of the target and log disk device drivers and the code of the VDisk kernel itself. The domain exports two virtual disk drivers to other Xen domains: the target partition is exported readwrite and the log partition is exported read-only. In addition, the secure cleaner has an interface through which remote domains submit cleaning requests.
We assume that a minimal Xen domain plus device driver is or can be made simple enough to be verified to be free of bugs. The VDisk secure kernel prototype adds 3,075 lines of C code to this domain -1,400 lines for logging, 900 lines for filtering, and 775 lines for cleaning -which we believe to fit within the complexity window needed for trust. We also assume that a suitable attestation mechanism could exist to protect the secure-domain code and the log disk partition from manipulation from outside of the virtual machine monitor. These assumptions are typical of any trusted computing base and systems that fulfill these assumptions are the subject of much work in this area [3, 11, 38] .
Version Logging
The VDisk logger is implemented as a simple device wrapper on top of the target partition's disk driver. All write requests to the VDisk pass through this wrapper. The wrapper sends one instance of each request to the target disk driver and another to the logging subsystem.
The log disk partition is sub-divided into large, fixed-sized segments (32-MB in our prototype) that are threaded together on three lists: the metadata log, the data log and the free list. The metadata and data logs are written in appendonly fashion, with new segments allocated from the free list when needed.
The system creates a new entry in the metadata log and in the data log for each write it receives. To the data log it writes a copy of the data written to the target partition. To the metadata log it writes a description of the write, including its physical sector ID on the target partition, its position in the data log, and a timestamp. The format of the metadata log is given in Table 1 .
Our prototype uses two filtering mechanisms to avoid writ-ing unnecessary data to the log. Both are file-system specific in the sense that they are confined to a subset of the target disk, as specified as part of the immutable client-system ID assigned when a VDisk instance is created. The first method performs content hashing at the granularity of 512-byte sectors. It compares each write request to a table of content summaries of recently-read blocks; if a sector of a block being written to disk is identical to its corresponding content summary, that sector is not logged. Our ext2 and ext3 implementations confine content hashing to inode blocks, which in these systems are easily identified by the secure kernel. We avoid content hashing every block only to avoid potentially unproductive processing overhead and content-hash pollution. The second method selects a set of physical sectors to be logged only once. We use this filter to avoid writing multiple versions of ext2 and ext3 superblock and group-descriptor blocks. These blocks are written frequently, but the changing values of their content are irrelevant to the file-version history. The performance implications of these two optimizations are covered in detail in Section 5.
Accessing Versioned Data
Key to VDisk's simplicity and thus its integrity is that it avoids any interpretation of the data it writes to the log. To be useful, however, it must be possible to reattach the filesystem semantics of this block-level data in order to browse the file system version history and retrieve old file versions. Doing so requires file-system specific actions and a degree of complexity unsuited to the secure kernel itself. In VDisk all of the interpretation of the log is performed in user-mode on the read-only image of the log exported by the secure kernel.
Our approach differs from gray-box systems such as D-GRAID [32] that use a generalized understanding of filesystem structures to deductively identify on-disk file systems from the block layer. In VDisk, the user-level version-access tools know a priori the identity of the file-system implementation that produced the logs. Different file system implementations will require different VDisk tools. Our prototype implements these tools for ext2 and ext3. Both of these file systems share nearly identical on-disk data structures, so the process of reconstructing file versions is similar in both cases. However, the lack of write ordering in ext2 presents additional challenges that do not arise when working with ext3 [31] (as described in Section 3.3.3); this section describes the reconstruction process for ext2.
A key advantage of performing these operations in usermode is that VDisk is free to use off-the-shelf tools for indexing and searching the log -tools that one would never imagine incorporating with an operating system as part of an in-kernel file system. Our prototype, for example, incrementally mirrors the metadata log (typically less than 0.5% the size of the data log) in MySQL [1] , an open-source relational database, copying new portions of the log into the database on demand when necessary to satisfy versionaccess queries. Similarly, we envision the use of other tools, such as a Google-like content index, to index both metadata and data logs.
Our approach contrasts with versioning file systems that continuously maintain an indexing structure for versioned data that is integrated with the file system itself. Our view is that the file-system's indexing structures are best suited for manipulating the current version of file data, where performance is crucial and for which file systems are carefully tuned. Access to historic data is substantially less frequent than current-version access and thus less performance critical. For historic data, the extra costs of operating in usermode and creating indexes in batch fashion, rather than continuously, are little noticed. As a result, powerful offthe-shelf indexing tools can be used to access old versions and current-version access is not compromised or complicated.
Our prototype implements two version-access algorithms. The first retrieves a specified version of a file, named by its pathname and the time the version existed. The second retrieves a list of every file creation, deletion or block write to files -the versions of the file -with a specified pathname over a specified time interval.
These operations are performed with the aid of MySQL, which creates two B-Tree indexes on the VDisk metadata: one is keyed on target-disk sector ID, and the other is keyed on timestamps. These indexes expedite the process of determining the log address of a particular block version.
The remainder of this section describes these two algorithms in detail. We present them as proof-of-concept, not as an exhaustive list of how version data would be accessed. These algorithms were easy to construct and we thus expect a mature versioning system would implement a wider variety of access methods than these two. The section concludes with a discussion of a key consistency issue that arises when reconstructing history files from block-level information.
Retrieving a File Version
The algorithm to retrieve a specified version of a file proceeds by fetching the appropriate version of every element in the file's pathname from the VDisk data log.
As a prelude, the algorithm first reads the superblock and group-descriptor blocks from the VDisk data log. To do this, it uses the physical sector ID of these blocks as a key to a MySQL query on the metadata log and then uses the resulting metadata-log entries to locate the appropriate blocks in the data log.
Each subsequent step of the pathname lookup involves using an inumber and the desired version time to fetch the directory or file they name. The algorithm first uses the group-descriptor blocks to locate the physical sector ID and block offset of the target inode. It then performs a MySQL lookup to locate the metadata-log entry for the newest version of this inode block that existed at or before the specified time. This entry in turn points to the desired version of inode block itself in the data log.
With an inode in hand, the algorithm now uses MySQL again to locate the metadata entries of the desired versions of every block named by that inode. The result of this query is an ordered list of the data-log entries that store the target version's data. If this pathname element is a directory, the algorithm reads it from the data log and searches it for the next name in the target file's path, retrieving its inumber and repeating the lookup process. The algorithm terminates on the last pathname entry, which is the file itself.
Retrieving a File History
The algorithm to retrieve a list of all versions of a specified file that existed over a specified interval is similar, but now multiple versions of every directory listed in the file's pathname are examined. This lookup is complicated by the fact that different files and directories can use the same name over a period of time. As a result, it is necessary to examine every version of every element in the file's pathname that existed over the interval to locate the set of inodes of files named by that pathname some time during the interval.
Once the set of inodes is determined, the algorithm queries MySQL for all versions of the containing inode block that existed in the specified interval. Each inode-block version is read from the data log and inspected: those that contain distinct modification times for that inode represent new versions of the file.
Consistency Issues
The previous description of the version-access algorithms overlooked an important issue that arises when applicationlevel write order is not reflected in the order that writes are delivered to the block layer. The problem is that applicationlevel ordering is important for determining data consistency, but the only ordering information available to VDisk is the order that block writes are submitted to the disk subsystem.
For example, if an application writes block A then B of a file, a version of that file that contains the new value of B, but not A, is inconsistent. In the VDisk metadata log, these writes are represented by two timestamped entries. They are written to the log and timestamped, however, in the order the blocks are delivered to the block layer, which may be different from the order the application writes them if disk writes are asynchronous to the application, as they typically are in local Unix file systems. As a result, the log might record B before A. If so, VDisk's version reconstruction mechanism risks delivering an inconsistent version of the file if a user requests a version at a time that falls between the timestamps of these two entries.
In file systems that do not order metadata disk writes, this problem can extend across multiple files when blocks belonging to a truncated inode are reallocated immediately after the inode is truncated. In this case, a short span of the log may record a block and two different inodes that name it. If the time-gap between these three entries is short enough, it is impossible for VDisk to tell whether the block belongs to the old inode or the new one. In every other case, the problem is confined to a single file. When multiple files are involved, a privacy concern arises when the two inodes convey different access rights (e.g., they belong to different users). In this case, VDisk tools restrict reads of the ambiguous block to users that have read access to both inodes.
In all of these cases, the problem is resolved if (1) there is a bound on the time between when an application writes to a file and when the resulting block modifications are written to disk by the file system and (2) there is a period of update quiescence for each file that is at least as long as this bound. In this case, the version-access tool can ensure consistency by delivering only file versions that have been quiescent for the disk-write-bound period of time. For example, most UNIX file systems write dirty blocks to disk periodically, every 30 seconds. For these systems, the version-access tool can guarantee consistency by restricting the block values it includes in a version to those that remain unchanged for at least 30 seconds. It is easy for the tool to establish this constraint by examining metadata-log timestamps and rolling forward when necessary until the gap between the block versions it selects and the next version of those blocks in the log is at least 30 seconds. Our ext2 version-access tool does this.
A potential problem remains, however, for files that are accessed so frequently that there are insufficient periods of quiescence or for file systems that provide no bound on how long updates can be cached in memory. In these cases there is little VDisk can do but rely on higher-level tools to determine which block-version configurations are consistent.
Fortunately, applications that care about the consistency of disk data typically have application-level (or in the case of file-system metadata, file-system-level) consistency constraints that, when combined with the VDisk version information, can be used to extract consistent versions in a straightforward manner. An application that uses atomic transactions to update a file, for example, places specific ordering constraints on transaction-log updates and between certain log entries and target-file checkpoints. As a result, the transaction log is properly ordered in the VDisk logs and any transaction-log entry that establishes a consistent checkpoint is properly ordered with respect to updates to the target file. It is thus straightforward for the transaction system's recovery manager to establish version consistency in much the same manner it would when recovering from a crash. As another example, consider a file updated in append-only fashion. In this case, the ordering constraint on VDisk log entries is the logical block number of updates and not their timestamp and so VDisk-log order is irrelevant.
VERSION PRUNING
If a version history cannot grow without bound, any system that retains multiple version of data must include a mechanism for pruning the version history it retains. Some systems limit the number of versions a system captures, others limit the amount of time a captured version is stored; most systems do both.
Limiting version capture involves coalescing multiple overlapping changes into a single version. For example, some versioning file systems coalesce updates made between file opens and closes, while snapshot systems coalesce between snapshots. These approaches, however, are not ideal for post-intrusion analysis and recovery, because the versions they coalesce might be just the ones needed to detect or recover from an intrusion [34, 33] . CVFS, for example, captures every file-system update that makes it to disk as a distinct file version.
A similar range of alternatives exist for limiting how long a captured version is stored. Some systems keep every version for a fixed period of time while others designate certain versions as being more important than others and then store important versions longer than non-important ones. For example, CVFS stores every version during a fixed detection window and discards versions older than this window, while the Elephant versioning file system keeps designated landmark versions forever.
VDisk combines these approaches to initially log every disk write but to then retain some versions longer than others. The key question for VDisk is thus whether it is possible to prune selected versions with minimal sacrifice of data security. As pointed out by others, allowing users to control pruning versions from the log is not acceptable, because doing so would open an unacceptable vulnerability to attack or user error [33] .
Our approach is to establish declarative constraints, expressed by a retention policy, that designate versions must be retained by the system, and to enforce these constraints in the VDisk secure kernel. In doing so, we divide the security question into two subproblems: (1) determining the vulnerabilities exposed by the retention policy and (2) determining whether the policy can be guaranteed securely.
The remainder of this section discusses VDisk's approach to these two subproblems in more detail.
Version Retention Policies
A version retention policy is a declarative statement that describes which file system versions must be retained and which need not be. The idea of retention policies originated with Elephant file system, which defined two of the policies, Keep Safe and Keep Landmarks, that we adapt for VDisk in a policy we call Keep Milestones.
Keep Safe
Keep Safe retains every version that was valid during the preceding keep-safe period. The VDisk keep-safe period is precisely analogous to the CVFS detection window. Notice that implementing this policy requires retaining versions that are themselves older than the keep-safe period. Consider, for example, a modification to a file that was previously modified a year ago in a system with a 30-day keep safe period. When the file is modified, the new version of the file is written to the log. The old version, which is also in the log, has a year-old timestamp and yet must be retained by the system for 30 additional days to ensure that this this last update can be undone. This example illustrates why simply treating the version log as a circular list, removing versions in sequence from the head of the log when necessary, does not provide particularly useful version-retention semantics. It is thus necessary for the system to remove some versions from the log and leave others no matter what version-purning heuristic the system follows.
Keep Landmarks
Keep Landmarks provides an additional constraint to Keep Safe that requires some file versions to be retained beyond the keep-safe period. In Elephant, certain versions are designated as landmarks by users or by the system; these landmark versions are retained by the system forever.
The system chooses landmarks using a heuristic that defines a maximum bound on the interval between a pair of file versions that requires both to be landmarks. If two versions of a file are created close enough together in time, the older version need not be retained. In Elephant, the value of this bound was determined by a time-dependent function that increased this interval as files aged.
The rationale behind this policy is that when a file is edited in rapid succession, eventually only the most recent version is important enough to retain beyond the keep-safe period. Note that for a version to be reclaimed using this policy its removal must satisfy both the keep-safe and the keep-landmark constraints.
Keep Milestones
VDisk implements a conservative approximation of Keep Landmarks that we call Keep Milestones. The policy has two parameters: the keep-safe period and the milestone interval. Both are expressed in units of time and are assigned to the VDisk when it is created and are thereafter immutable.
As with Keep Landmarks, the policy places two constraints on block retention. The first requires retaining any version of a file or directory that was valid within the keep-safe period. The second requires retaining indefinitely any version of a file or directory that exists in the system without being modified again for the milestone interval.
One difference between Keep Milestones and the Keep Landmarks is that VDisk's milestone interval is a constant rather than a sliding scale, as is the case of the landmarks interval in Keep Landmarks. This change was made simply for prototype-implementation expediency; it would be a simple matter to follow Keep Landmarks in this regard, if it proved useful.
The remaining difference between the policies exists to allow the VDisk secure kernel to play its role in log cleaning without knowledge of file-system semantics. The remainder of this section describes that process; Section 4.3 describes this difference.
Deleting Versions Securely
The VDisk cleaner is divided into two parts, an untrusted user-mode cleaner and a secure component in the VDisk secure kernel.
The user-mode cleaner uses MySQL and other tools to select a set of versions for deletion and submit them as a cleaning request to the VDisk secure kernel. Among the issues the user-mode part of the cleaner considers is, for example, which log segments contain the largest fraction of deletable versions and can thus be cleaned with lowest overhead, similar to the LFS cleaner [29] . These segments are preferred cleaning targets, because cleaning overhead is dominated by the cost of rewriting the undeleted versions in a reclaimed segment to another segment. The key difference from LFS and similar systems such as CVFS, however, is that this complexity is confined to a user-mode application that need not be trusted to be correct. Note, however, that the cleaner does require read-only access to the entire filesystem log and thus it is privileged and for data accesscontrol reasons must be as secure as the file-system itself.
The role of the secure cleaner is to verify that cleaning requests conform to the VDisk's version-retention policy and, if so, to modify the VDisk metadata and data logs as instructed by the request. Our approach is inspired by similar ideas used in the Exokernel to implement shared file systems among multiple library operating systems securely, but without installing file-system complexity in the minimal, trusted Exokernel [9] .
The VDisk secure kernel implements two cleaning operations: prune data log and compact metadata log.
The prune-data-log request consists of two lists that name entries in the VDisk metadata log: the deletion-candidate and retention-proof lists. The deletion-candidate list names a set of VDisk entries to remove from a single data-log segment. For each deletion candidate, the retention proof list names two proof-check log entries used to validate the deletion.
The compact-metadata-log request simply names a single metadata log segment to be compacted. This operation does not remove data and thus no retention-proof step is necessary.
Verifying a Retention Proof
For the prune-data-log requests, the Keep Milestone policy has two retention constraints that the secure cleaner must verify: the keep-safe requirement, which ensures unlimited undo within the keep-safe period, and the milestone constraint, which ensures that only versions superseded within the milestone interval can be freed.
To show that the keep-safe constraint holds, it is sufficient to show that a newer version of the candidate block exists in the log and that both versions are older than the keepsafe period. The secure cleaner verifies this constraint by reading the metadata-log entry of the candidate version and the proof-check version. It verifies that the proof version names the same target-disk physical extent as the candidate version (or a superset) and then checks the timestamps of the proof and candidate versions against the current time to ensure they are older than the value specified by the keepsafe period parameter. If either test fails, VDisk rejects the cleaning request.
To show that the keep-milestone constraint holds, it is sufficient to show that the candidate version is bracketed in time by two other versions of the same block that are within a milestone period of each other. In this case, the newest version contains any changes made since the oldest that could possibly survive the milestone interval and thus the candidate version is redundant.
The secure cleaner verifies these keep-milestone constraints by reading the metadata entries for the candidate version and both proof-check versions. It then ensures that both proof versions cover the target-disk extent of the candidate and that the second proof version covers the first. Finally, it compares the metadata timestamp values of the blocks to ensure that the candidate version is ordered between the first and second proof versions and that the difference between newest and oldest is not more than the milestone interval. If either of these tests fail, VDisk rejects the cleaning request.
Transforming the Logs
For prune-data-log requests, if all retention proofs are verified as valid, the secure cleaner removes the deletion candidates from the version history. To do this, it first locates the data-log segment that contains the candidates and copies entries not deleted to the end of the data log. It then unlinks this segment from the data log and adds it to the freesegment list. As it does this, it updates the metadata-log by flagging deleted entries and by updating the data-log location of undeleted entries. It leaves deleted entries in place in the metadata log, because these entries are much smaller than the corresponding data-log entries and thus far more entries fit in a metadata-log segment than a data-log segment. The user-mode cleaner periodically compacts the metadata log by issuing requests to the secure cleaner.
For compact-metadata requests, the secure cleaner reads the metadata-log segment named in that request and copies undeleted entries in it to the end of the log. It then unlinks this segment from the metadata log and adds it to the free list.
Why Keep Milestones is Different
We now come to the final difference between VDisk's Keep Milestone policy and Elephant's Keep Landmark policy. While VDisk's milestone verification test is sufficient to satisfy the Keep Landmarks policy, it is stronger than necessary, forc- The reason for this extra constraint in Keep Milestones is that the secure VDisk kernel does not distinguish filesystem inode blocks from other data blocks; at the blocklevel all blocks look the same. A potential problem arises with inode blocks, because they store multiple inodes and are thus shared among multiple files. In Keep Landmarks, the existence of a version of a block at time t can allow the deletion of another version of that block created at t − . But if the block in question is an inode block and the two updates were to different inodes within the block, the time t version should not impact whether the time t − version is a landmark or not.
For example, consider the following update sequence to two files X and Y that share an inode block: extend X at t1, extend Y at t2, extend X at t3. Figure 1 shows the four inode block versions this sequence would produce in the log. Assume the milestone interval for this example is δ. Without the second Keep-Milestones check, the block versions at times t1 and t2 would be deleted, because neither version persists unchanged for longer than δ seconds. However, the version of file X that was extended at time t1 persisted unchanged for more than δ seconds, and so its inode, which exists in the block versions at t1 and t2, must be retained. With the extra Keep Milestones constraint, the block version at t0 must be kept because no older versions of the block exist; the version at t1 may be deleted because it is bracketed by two versions that are within one milestone period of each other, while the version at time t2 must be kept because it is not simlarly bracketed after the version at t1 is deleted; and the version at t3 must be kept because there is no newer version of the block.
Because blocks can be shared between files, it is not sufficient merely to keep block versions that persist unchanged for the milestone interval: VDisk must retain any portion of any block that persists unchanged for the interval. The milestone proof criteria guarantee that this requirement is upheld by retaining the first and last version in each sequence of versions that exist within the same milestone interval. Any byte of any intermediary block in such a sequence will either be identical to the corresponding byte of the first version in the sequence, or identical to the corresponding byte of the last version in the sequence, or different than the corresponding bytes of both the first and the last versions in the sequence. In the first two cases, the block can be deleted because it contains redundant data. In the last case, the block can be deleted because it did not persist unchanged for the milestone interval.
Remaining Vulnerabilities
Log pruning inevitably introduces vulnerability for data loss. An intruder whose goal is to destroy file-system data succeeds when it overwrites or deletes data and the log entries that contain the valid version of this data are pruned from the log. Every system that bounds the size of its secure log is subject to this vulnerability.
Similar to other secure logging systems such as CVFS, VDisk provides a detection window in which no version can be removed from the log. No vulnerability exists for intrusions detected and rectified within this window.
VDisk is unique in that it provides some durability guarantee beyond this initial detection window. VDisk's KeepMilestones goal is to forever ensure the durability of important versions of a file. It does this by providing an absolute guarantee that every file version that survives for a milestone period without being overwritten is securely durable, forever. Versions that are overwritten within this interval, however, are subject to deletion once they are older than the keep safe detection window.
A vulnerability in this approach arises when an intruder is able to overwrite a file within the milestone period of its last legitimate update. In this case, if the intruder's update goes undetected for the keep safe detection window, its version supplants the legitimate one as the file's milestone and the legitimate version is subject to deletion. The impact of this vulnerability, however, is bound by the length of the milestone period. Our results in Section 5.3 show that a period of one hour is sufficient to achieve significant log compaction. In this case, the intruder has only one hour from when a block is written to overwrite it. In addition, a user that verifies the validity of a file when it is an hour old is ensured that that version is forever invulnerable to attack.
EVALUATION
Secure versioning primarily consumes two system resources: IO bandwidth and storage space. In addition, the use of Xen to isolate VDisk can also impact the overall performance of a system. VDisk's IO bandwidth consumption is manifested in reduced write throughputs and increased write latencies. As well, logging writes at the block layer requires significantly more storage than a typical, non-versioning system. Understanding the rate at which the log grows is particularly important, because this directly impacts VDisk's ability to retain important information.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, VDisk employs two filtering strategies to avoid logging unneeded data. To evaluate their importance, these features were disabled during the following experiments.
Performance
In this section, we investigate the performance of VDisk as perceived from the application layer in both a standard Linux kernel and Xen. All experiments were conducted with a 1GHz Pentium III machine with two 320GB IDE disks, one containing an ext2 file system with a 4KB block size and the other containing the VDisk log with a 32MB segment size; each disk provides a raw IO bandwidth of approximately 15 MB/s. Experiments were run on the native machine and in a Xen 3.0 virtual machine; both the native and virtual machines were equipped with 512MB of RAM. On the native machine, a standard 2.6 Linux kernel was used, while in Xen, a 2.6 XenoLinux kernel was used.
Bonnie++
Bonnie++ is a benchmark designed to test file system throughput. We configured Bonnie++ to operate on a 1GB file. The benchmark consists of five stages: (1) the file is written one character at a time; (2) the file is deleted and then written one block at a time; (3) the file is rewritten one block at a time (note that this requires one read and one write per block); (4) the file is read one character at a time; and finally, (5) the file is read one block at a time. In each of these stages, the file is processed sequentially. To better observe the effects of disk seeks on VDisk's performance, we added one additional stage, in which block writes were performed at random offsets within the file. Figure 2 shows the results of the Bonnie++ benchmark. Each value in the graph is the average of 20 runs; the maximum relative standard deviation across all tests was 3.06%. As is expected, the effect of VDisk on disk reads is negligible; this is because the original file system image is kept intact, and reads are passed directly to the underlying disk without any extra processing. In native Linux, VDisk imposes 51% and 50% reductions in throughput for sequential character and block writes, respectively. This is the worst-case scenario for VDisk, but it is only likely to occur in specific cases, such as when a large file is being copied.
In the rewrite and random-write stages of the test, which do not involve sustained, sequential writes, VDisk imposes 14% and 37% reductions in throughput, respectively. This is due to the fact that these stages are seek-limited rather than throughput-limited. In these stages, writes to the file system are scattered randomly across the disk, but writes to VDisk's log are sequential, and thus incur a much smaller performance penalty. The reduction in bus bandwidth imposed by VDisk is almost completely overshadowed by the seek overhead of the file system disk, and thus both the raw disk and VDisk perform very similarly in these scenarios.
PostMark
PostMark was designed by Network Appliances to simulate an email server. To do this, PostMark creates a large number of text files of various sizes on which it performs a large number of IO transactions, including reads, appends, creations and deletions. We configured PostMark to create 20,000 files between 0.5KB and 10KB in size and perform 50,000 transactions with an even read/write ratio, resulting in about 270MB of data being written to disk. Figure 3 displays the averaged results of twenty PostMark trials. The maximum relative standard deviation for all trials was 1.44%. VDisk performs similarly to the raw disk in this benchmark, imposing a 9.7% increase in overall time in a native Linux environment. As in the random block write stage of Bonnie++, the PostMark benchmark is seeklimited, and the time required to seek in the original file system disk almost completely overshadows the time needed to perform the extra sequential writes to the VDisk log.
Discussion
VDisk's strategy of duplicating all disk writes imposes overhead on IO-bus-throughput-limited disk operations. Bonnie++ verifies the expectation that performing large, se- quential writes with VDisk will consume approximately twice as much bandwidth as doing so with a raw disk. However, as can be seen in the random write test of Bonnie++ and the PostMark tests, VDisk has a much smaller impact on seek-limited disk writes. VDisk's performance relative to a non-versioned ext3 file system is better than the relative performance of CVFS to ext2 in the PostMark benchmark: CVFS takes more than twice as long as an asynchronous ext2 file system to complete the benchmark [33] , while VDisk imposes just a 10% overhead.
As a number of studies have shown, users interact predominately with small files [2, 24, 12] . Larger files are typically accessed randomly in a piecemeal fashion, and -as in the case of executable binaries, dynamic loadable libraries, and font files -are often opened for reads only. Thus in many cases, the user-perceived overhead of VDisk will be closer to the 10% exhibited by PostMark and the random write phase of Bonnie++ than the 50% exhibited by the sequential write phase of Bonnie++, although specific actions, such as copying large files, will incur more significant penalties.
Log Growth
To gain insight into the rate at which VDisk's log will grow and the efficacy of our reclamation policies, we have made [7] . The EECS trace collected NFS usage statistics of the primary home directory server of Harvard's computer science faculty and research groups. This server was used for research, software development and course work. To replay the trace, we converted the logged NFS commands into local file system operations, which were then executed synchronously on a local disk with an ext2 file system with a block size of 4KB. We replayed the first 57 days of this approximately eleven week trace. Figure 4 displays the daily growth of both the file system and the log normalized to the 317 distinct uid values contained in the trace.
Metadata blocks constitute a large portion of the block log. Over one quarter of the log is composed of versions of file system blocks zero through four, out of a total of 14,801,516 distinct file system block addresses written during the trace. However, while versions of these few file system block addresses make up a large proportion of the log, the majority of block addresses were written to only once during the trace. Just over 70% of all file system block addresses were written only once, and over 95% were written less than ten times. Figure 5 illustrates the efficacy of content hashing in reducing log growth. This plot displays the growth of the log during the first day of the trace. By the end of the day, 4,630,712 blocks had been written to the log. We reran this one-day trace with two hashing policies: the first hashed only inode sectors, while the second hashed both inode sectors and the sectors composing file system blocks zero through four, which contain the superblock and group descriptors.
Content Hashing
With both policies, we used a hash table of 256KB to store 128-bit MD5 content summaries of targeted sectors as they were read from disk. When hashing only inodes, there were 492,304 writes to targeted sector addresses, of which 450,417-or 91%-were identical to their hashed counterparts and were not written to the log. When hashing file system blocks zero through four as well as inode blocks, there were 2,061,016 writes to target sector addresses, of which 1,899,042-or 92%-were identical to their hashed counterparts.
Hashing just inode blocks resulted in a modest log size reduction of about 10% at the end of one day, while hashing the superblock and group descriptors along with inode blocks resulted in a more substantial reduction of 41%. Content hashing was particularly effective in this experiment because writes were performed synchronously, resulting in a large number of metadata blocks being flushed to disk with minimal changes. Further gains could be obtained with the use of delta-encoding to store these small changes in units more compact than sectors (512 bytes).
Block Reclamation
VDisk's block retention policies are based upon block lifetimes: according to the keep milestone policy, block versions that are overwritten in a short period of time are eligible for reclamation. The efficacy of these policy-based reclamation schemes is thus dependent upon the average lifetimes of blocks.
Almost 82% of blocks logged during the EECS trace replay were overwritten in under one second. This number is higher than that reported in an analysis of five days of the same trace in [8] because our replay of the trace includes block writes required for file system metadata updates that are not explicitly included in the NFS log (versions of block addresses zero through four alone constitute 11% of blocks overwritten in one second). Moreover, it is significantly higher than the 20% reported in Roselli's analysis of different traces [28] . However, both our trace replay and the analysis in [8] show that 90% or more of blocks in the EECS trace are overwritten within an hour, while between 70% and 80% of blocks in four out of five of the traces analyzed by Roselli are overwritten within an hour.
Landmark Retention Policy
In order to evaluate a file-system-aware reclamation policy, we applied a simulated landmark policy to the NFS trace. Figure 6 displays the number of blocks retained by the landmark policy with landmark windows of one hour, one week, four weeks, and nine weeks. The nine week case illustrates the optimal scenario for the landmark policy; with this landmark window, only files that remained alive throughout the entire trace are retained. Figure 6 also displays the results of applying the milestone retention policy to our log with one hour, one week, four week, and nine week milestone windows. With a one hour window, 83% of retained blocks were kept because they constituted either the first or last version of their file system block addresses; according to the milestone policy, these versions must be retained regardless of their lifetimes. This number increases to 99% and 100% with four and nine week windows, respectively.
Milestone Retention Policy
Using a milestone window of just one hour, 81% of logged blocks can be reclaimed. Using the best-case milestone window of nine weeks, 84% of logged blocks can be reclaimed. These results are consistent with the general characteristics described above: typically, blocks are either rewritten immediately or they are written less than three times during the entire trace.
Discussion
In general, both the milestone and the landmark retention policies allow for the reclamation of a large proportion of versioned data. Due to the high number of blocks with short lifetimes, this is not surprising.
It is interesting to note that both policies retain nearly the same number of blocks. With a one hour window, the milestone policy retains 11% more blocks than the landmark policy, and this number decreases to just 2% with a four week window. Although our simulation of the landmark policy did not account for file system metadata blocks, we expect the overhead required for these blocks will be quite low, as the average number of retained file versions with a landmark window of one hour is 1.11%.
While the milestone policy is obliged to be more conservative than the landmark policy in order to ensure the preservation of landmark files, the bimodal write patterns exhibited by the EECS workload mitigate the penalties incurred by this conservatism. The milestone policy mandates that both the first and the last version of any block address must be retained, but the majority of block addresses retained by both policies were only written to once, resulting in similar performance for both policies. For the same reason, both policies are nearly as effective with a stability window of one hour as they are with a window of nine weeks. The vast majority of blocks reclaimed by either policy are overwritten in under one hour, and blocks that survive this initial hour tend to live for a long time. Figure 7 shows the rate at which VDisk's log would grow if it was cleaned daily according to the landmark and milestone policies with a stability window of one hour. Both the landmark and milestone policies dramatically curtail log growth, keeping the log size to within just 36% and 50% of the original file system size, respectively. For this workload, cleaning the log required the relocation of 4.72MB of data per user per day, or about 20% of the daily log growth. If the log is cleaned during periods of low system activity, the performance impact of this relocation overhead should be unobtrusive.
File Reconstruction
Reconstructing file versions involves two tasks: resolving the target path and reconstructing the desired file version. In general, the former task is the more taxing of the two, as it can involve searching through multiple versions of multiple directories, whereas the latter task can be reduced to a simple process of collecting blocks. The time required to reconstruct file versions is affected by a number of parameters, including the size of the metadata log, the depth of the target path, the number of versions of each directory along the path, the number of files contained in each directory along We used a modified version of the PostMark benchmark to quantify the time required to reconstruct file versions under a few specific scenarios. PostMark was changed to perform all writes synchronously, thus ensuring that every file version accessed in memory was committed to disk. We configured PostMark to write to 10,000 files distributed evenly across 50 directories, with a maximum path depth of 10. This produced about 5,500,000 distinct file versions, committing 45.07GB of data to the log.
Path Resolution
Path resolution is a process of translating a path to an inode number. This process can be greatly expedited by a few well-chosen indexes. For instance, a user-space tool could periodically traverse recently logged file system versions, recording path names and inode numbers for each file and directory it encounters along the way; this index could completely obviate the path resolution process during later reconstruction requests. While we have not implemented this inode index, we do rely upon two MySQL indexeskeyed on file system block addresses and time stampsto speed the path resolution process; building these indexes for this experiment required 115.56 seconds and 197.04 seconds, respectively, and the combined size of these indexes was 206.7MB. Figure 8 shows the times required to resolve paths of various depths from the log, given the approximate times at which each target version existed. We re-ran this experiment with only 80MB of RAM so that the MySQL index could not fit entirely in memory, but the impact this had on reconstruction times was negligible. The time required to reconstruct every version of a target path was substantially longer, ranging from 88.33 seconds for a one-directory path to 989.33 for a ten-directory path.
File Reconstruction
Once a file's inumber is known, the process of reconstructing a file version is simple: the file system address of each block contained in the file (including the inode and indirect pointer blocks) must be mapped to its corresponding log address via the metadata database.
A naive implementation of this translation process could query the database once for each block in the file. Such an approach would yield reconstruction times scaling linearly in proportion to the number of required queries. The power of user-space indexing techniques becomes evident when a more sophisticated translation approach is adopted. By populating a temporary table with all of the desired file system block addresses and taking the cross product of this table with the database, all translations can be achieved in a single database query. This approach yields reconstruction times ranging from 1.46 seconds for a 1KB file to 1.69 seconds for a 1MB file to 3.22 seconds for a 10MB file.
CONCLUSION
Data durability is too important to trust to the operating system, which is too large to be free from vulnerabilities or other bugs. Instead, we believe that durability should be ensured by a small component installed as part of a system's trusted computing base, for example in an isolated virtualmachine domain, or perhaps by hardware. The challenge is to provide sufficient functionality in the trusted layer to provide suitably strong durability guarantees without complicating the system to the extent that it cannot be trusted. It is thus important to identify a core, and to the extent possible, minimal set of data protection components.
One important part of any strategy for ensuring data durability must include keeping multiple versions of data to protect the data from accidental or malicious destruction. It follows that versioning support be included in the trusted computing base. Doing so without introducing a complexity explosion, however, requires care in dealing with the connection between file-system semantics and versions (e.g., extracting file-grain version information) and compaction of the version log.
VDisk addresses this problem by implementing a core set of replication and versioning services as a small addition to a Xen virtual-machine domain. This versioned disk is then available for use by any standard, unmodified file system. Most of the complexity of accessing the version history and removing versions from it is handled by a set of untrusted, user-mode tools.
The VDisk trusted kernel simply logs every file-system write to disk, exports the log read-only and provides a simple proof-based method for securely deleting versions from the log. To support log cleaning, we assign a set of versionretention constraints to each VDisk instance. A periodic, user-mode cleaner performs most of the heavy lifting, but submits cleaning requests to the trusted kernel. These requests are formatted to make it easy for the secure kernel to verify that deleting the requested versions is allowed by the disk's version-retention constraints and then to delete these versions, if allowed.
Our evaluation shows that logging overhead is 50% for IObus-bandwidth limited applications, as expected, and negligible for disk-seek limited applications. Additionally, we show, using the Harvard EECS trace, that our simple content hashing techniques eliminate 40% of log writes and that the Keep Milestones cleaner reclaims 80% of data written to disk, while retaining as milestones all file versions that existed unchanged for an hour or more.
